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If I pick A Winning Manager, Aren’t I Likely To 
Beat The Market?
By Ben Brinkerhoff
Ben Brinkerhoff is Head of Partner Growth at Consilium NZ and Member of the Consilium Investment Committee 
Recently in New Zealand a few star managers have had 
brilliant runs easily outperforming markets since inception. 
Why on earth would an investor not want to use these 
funds for their New Zealand share allocation? We have 
a lot of respect for what star performers have done.  It’s 
not easy to produce exceptional performance.  But for all 
their glory, the websites of the star performers provide us 
with the answer to the question… “Past performance is no 
guarantee of future returns.” When asked a question about 
a star investment manager we typically respond with a 
question of our own that goes something like this, “Would 
you believe that this is a very well-studied issue?”  
Many academic peer reviewed papers have been 
written on the question of whether or not we can simply 
allocate money to a fund that has a good record, and 
expect to beat the market in the future.  It’s a topic that has 
been researched across different time periods, different 
countries and different asset classes. The findings of these 
studies are just as the disclosure statement suggests - past 
performance is no guarantee of future returns. Perhaps we 
would put it more strongly: the evidence shows that past 
outperformance tells you next to nothing about future 
outperformance. 
Below, we summarise two of the many papers on this 
subject, one from the United States and one from New 
Zealand. In 1997, Carhart published “On Persistence in 
Mutual Fund Performance” in the Journal of Finance.  This 
paper addresses the exact question posed above.  Does 
the good performance of investment managers persist? 
Can I select a manager with good records and expect 
to beat the market? To answer this question, Carhart uses 
a comprehensive database of 1,892 equity (share) funds 
from the period 1962 - 1993.  Regarding the comprehensive 
nature of his data, he states, “the data… include all known 
equity funds over this period.” The author summarises his 
conclusions on the persistence of investment managers’ 
performance this way:
“Common factors in share returns and investment 
expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity 
mutual funds’ mean and risk-adjusted returns… The only 
significant persistence not explained is concentrated 
in strong underperformance by the worst-return mutual 
funds.  The results do not support the existence of skilled or 
informed mutual fund portfolio managers.”
In other words Dr Carhart is saying that, once he 
accounts for types of investment risk taken by the manager, 
that investment managers beat the market in the future 
only by chance. In New Zealand there is only one published 
study we are aware of that analyses the persistence of 
New Zealand investment managers.  In 2006, Bauer, Otten 
and Tourani Rad published “New Zealand mutual funds: 
measuring performance and persistence in performance”.
This study reviewed a sample of 143 mutual funds for the 
time period 1990 – 2003.  Their results show that performance 
in New Zealand mutual funds does not persist more than 
luck alone can explain. The authors conclude:
“It has to be noted that the documented persistence 
in performance is mainly driven by icy hands, instead 
of hot hands indicating that funds that underperform 
(significantly negative alpha) in one period are most 
likely to underperform in the next period.  Investors 
should therefore avoid these funds.  However, evidence 
of persistently out-performing funds (significantly positive 
alpha) is absent.”
In summary, the paper finds no evidence that an 
investor can reliably outperform markets in the current 
period by selecting a fund that outperformed markets 
in the last period. 
It is probably helpful to get away from the academic 
articles for a moment and just look at some practical 
examples. There are businesses like Morningstar dedicated 
to rating funds.  Their proprietary research goes beyond 
mere performance and looks to identify quality in 
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investment management and investment approaches. 
Morningstar gives their best rated funds five stars, while 
the worst funds get one star.  If anyone is going to find a 
winning fund manager, it’s Morningstar. Yet their record is in 
performance prediction is abysmal.  A recent study looked 
at the 248 managed funds that Morningstar rated five stars 
in 1999 to see how they had performed over the ensuing 
decade.
The chart below shows the story.  A decade later only 4 
out of 248 funds were still five stars, and 87 funds had gone 
out of business.  The average return of a Morningstar five 
star fund over the 10 years was worse than the average 
return of all other funds put together.
The data here correspond to a study by Gerrans (2006) 
published in the Academic Journal Accounting and Finance 
entitled “Morningstar ratings and future performance”.
He found that:
“By far the strongest case to mount is that of no 
significant difference between relative rating and future 
performance…. if an investor is looking to the star for 
guidance, this analysis suggests that they might be better 
served examining information on fees, which over the 
period of analysis appear greater on average than 
ratings differentials and are far more certain.”
So we can see Morningstar is likely no guide.  But it’s not 
Morningstar’s fault. 
Below we look at all the funds monitored by Morningstar 
from 2004 to 2008 in the US Large Cap Blend asset class 
and ranked them from the very best performing fund to the 
very worst performing fund.  Thanks to Index Fund Advisors 
(www.ifa.com), we can see how this looks in graphic form 
using the top chart from the figure below. 
The bottom chart shows the performance of those same 
funds from 2009 – 2013, keeping the same ordinal ranking 
as the top chart.  There’s no real pattern, other than 
perhaps, on average, the badly performing funds in the first 
period did better in the second period. It’s no wonder top 
academic researchers have told us that past performance 
does not persist and is no guide in selecting fund managers. 
In another study Vanguard ran a test to show the 
practical implications of this research. They compared two 
strategies that investors may employ. The first they called 
“Performance-Chasing” and the second they called “Buy-
and-Hold”. For the performance-chasing strategy they 
randomly selected a fund in top 50% of peers over the past 
three years. If the fund ever fell below the top 50% they 
would replace it randomly with another fund of the same 
asset class in the top 50%. In other words this strategy was 
always holding a fund in the top 50% of peers based on 3 
years of historical data.  In the second strategy called “Buy 
and Hold” they picked a fund at random, regardless of 
performance history, and held it in thick and thin. They ran 
this experiment over and over again across several asset 
classes. Below we see the median result for all nine asset 
classes they tested. Buy-and-Hold crushed Performance 
Chasing. 
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The Vanguard study picks funds at random. In the real 
world funds aren’t picked at random. Pension funds, 
for example, spend quite large amounts of money on 
consultants to help them pick the funds that are likely to be 
winners in the near future.  Another study published in the 
Journal of Finance looked at pension funds in the United 
States. The study showed very clearly that the investment 
managers selected by these pension funds had very 
impressive track records.  They produced excess returns 
(fancy talk for beating the pension’s existing funds) by 4% 
to 9% in the years before the pension funds selected them. 
The study was how the funds performed after they were 
selected. The answer?  The fired funds beat the hired (or 
selected) funds!  The first year the fired beat the hired by 
0.49%; the second year by 0.88% and the third year by 1.03%. 
Why? Because past performance is no guarantee of future 
performance.  The results of the study are illustrated below. 
What can we learn from this evidence?  If persistence in 
performance is mostly random, then picking managers on 
the basis of good track-records is likely to:
I. Increase costs and therefore reduce our expected 
return
II. Reduce the certainty we achieve that return
Neither of these results are in the best interests of investors. 
None of this is to take away from the achievements of star 
managers with great recent performance.  But it does mean 
that we don’t believe that their performance, impressive as 
it is, forms a basis on which we can conclude it is likely to 
persist in the future. So what qualities and characteristics 
can you use to prudently select investment managers? 
We’ll cover that next time. 
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